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The research program of explainable AI (xAI) has been developed with the aim
of providing tools and methods for reducing opacity and making AI systems more
humanly understandable. Unfortunately, the majority of xAI scholars actually clas-
sify a system as more or less opaque by confronting it with traditional rules-based
systems, which are usually assumed to be the prototype of transparent systems. In
doing so, the concept of opacity remains unexplained. To overcome this issue, we
propose to view opacity as a pragmatic concept. Based on this, we then explicit
the distinction between access opacity, link opacity and informational opacity, hence
providing the groundwork for a conceptual taxonomy of the concept of opacity for
AI systems.
1 The pragmatic nature of opacity in AI
Developed to provide tools and methods for reducing the opacity of AI system and making
them more humanly understandable, the research program of explainable AI (xAI) has
captured the attention of several scholars (Guidotti et al., 2018; Liao et al., 2021; Doshi-
Velez and Kim, 2017; Zednik, 2019).1 Nevertheless, some of the fundamental concerns
motivating this program remain unanswered. The relevant xAI literature provide in fact
very few systematic attempts to answer questions such as: what kind of forms opacity
may take? or, which features make an AI system opaque? in which sense?2 Instead the
majority of xAI scholars simply classify systems as more or less opaque depending on their
∗Both authors have contributed equally to this work. They are thus listed in alphabetic order.
1For a survey of current xAI literature, see e.g. (Adadi and Berrada, 2018).
2See, for instance (Burrell, 2016)
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similarities with traditional rules-based systems, which are assumed to be the prototype
of transparent systems (Liao et al., 2021; Doshi-Velez and Kim, 2017). Unfortunately,
such “naive” approach does not really contribute at clarifying the notion of opacity. On
the contrary, it might undermine the whole xAI program; after all, how can opacity be
reduced without really understanding its nature?
Here, we take a different approach. The starting observation is that, in the field of AI,
opacity is perceived as concerning the use of a system by a given stakeholder, in a certain
context and with a certain purpose. It occurs when the information the system conveys
is inadequate or insufficient to fulfill the desired uses and objectives attributed to it. It
has therefore to be understood as a pragmatic, or contextual, concept, which may take
different forms and characteristics precisely depending on the nature of the given context,
the given stakeholder and its purposes.
2 A first small taxonomy
In what follows, we propose a taxonomy that distinguishes three main forms of pragmatic
opacity, each being prone to a further deeper analysis.3. We refer to them as access opacity,
link opacity and informational opacity.
2.1 Access opacity
Access opacity is about the capability of understanding the structure and functioning of
a system. It manifests when human stakeholders have limited access to the epistemi-
cally relevant elements (EREs) within the system’s inner structure that allow them to
understand, predict and control the computational behaviour of the considered system.
Here, by epistemically relevant we denote those elements that allow human stakeholders
to understand, predict and control the computational behaviour of the considered system.4
Three main factors may be limiting the access to those EREs.5 The first is represented by
the transparency policies adopted by the system’s designers, as they might deliberately
obscure some relevant details of the system’s structure for either commercial, competi-
tion or privacy reasons. The second factor is the stakeholder’s background knowledge.
Intuitively, the more a stakeholder is familiar with a given AI system, the more they are
able to understand, predict and control the system’s behaviour. The third factor is the
3This deeper analysis is presented in the extended (full) version of this work.
4The notion of epistemically relevant element is borrowed from (Humphreys, 2009).
5The three factors corresponds to the three kind of opacity described by Burrell (2016): “opacity as
intentional corporate or state secrecy”, “opacity as technical illiteracy”, and finally “opacity as the way
algorithms operate at the scale of application”.
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complexity of the system’s structure.6 As humans have limited cognitive resources, their
ability to understand, predict and control the system’s behaviours decreases as the number
of relevant elements increases. Usually, the bigger is a system, the more it results opaque
to access because the higher is the number of EREs included in its structure.
Access opacity may occur in different forms, the reason being that a given description
of an AI system depends on the chosen level of abstraction (LoA) (Primiero, 2019). Each
LoA having its own proper structure that includes different epistemically relevant elements,
for each one of them a different form of access opacity can then be identified.7
2.2 Link opacity
Link opacity concerns the use of AI systems in scientific research. It manifests when
a system is used to model a given phenomenon but conveys inadequate or insufficient
information about the elements that are relevant for explaining, predicting and controlling
the considered phenomenon.8 In this context, link opacity represents a serious problem
especially for the employment of machine learning (ML) models in sciences. As a matter
of fact, because of their incredible accuracy in predicting phenomena by learning directly
from data (Alpaydin, 2021; Baldi, 2021), in recent years ML systems have been replacing
more traditional scientific models (Anderson, 2008; Leonelli, 2016). Unfortunately, as they
generate mere associative models, ML systems are usually unable to inform about either
the laws, the causes or the mechanisms behind the predicted phenomena, and therefore
they do not fulfill the desiderata of a scientific model, namely explaining, predicting and
controlling (or performing intervention) (López-Rubio and Ratti, 2021).
Similarly to access opacity, link opacity also occurs in different forms. This is be-
cause the elements that are relevant for explaining, predicting and controlling a given
phenomenon vary depending on the nature of the considered phenomenon.
Notice that link opacity and access opacity are logically independent concepts, in the
sense that their definitions are mutually independent9. However, some form of access
transparency may be necessary to obtain some form of link transparency.10
6See also (López-Rubio and Ratti, 2021).
7As explained in the full version of this work, the three forms of opacity described by Creel (2020),
and called, respectively, run opacity, structural opacity and algorithmic opacity, constitute three different
instances of access opacity differing precisely by the considered level of abstraction in the case where
the stakeholder is a computer scientist and what is at stake is the understanding of the behaviour of a
computing artefact.
8The concept of link opacity is close to link uncertainty, a notion introduced by Sullivan (2020).
9The concept of link opacity is not needed to define access opacity, and viceversa.
10This point is explained in the full version of this work.
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2.3 Informational opacity
Informational opacity relates to the format, or setup, adopted by a system for storing and
manipulating information. In rules-based systems, for instance, information is stored by
means of logical formulae that are manipulated through the application of syntactic rules.
On the contrary, a deep neural networks represents the information it learns by modifying
the weights associated with its connections.
It is crucial to notice that formats influence the stakeholder-system interaction. They
may indeed prevent the stakeholder to access the stored information or to reconstruct the
inferences thorough which the system manipulate information. In general, how and to
what extent the stakeholder-system interaction is affected is function of both the nature
of the format and the stakeholder’s cognitive abilities and purposes. We thus say that a
system manifests informational opacity for a given stakeholder (in a given context and with
certain purposes) when, because of the used format and the stakeholder’s cognitive abilities
and purposes, either the stakeholder cannot get access to the information embedded in the
system, or they are unable to reconstruct the inferences that manipulate such information.
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